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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
BARRY, Circuit Judge
In this appeal, we are called upon to determine whether
the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code prohibit a
lender from seeking to recoup unpaid pre-petition escrow
payments from a bankrupt debtor outside the confines of the
bankruptcy proceeding. The Bankruptcy Court and the District
Court found that Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
(“Countrywide”) did not have a pre-petition claim against
Francisco and Anna Rodriguez and thus did not violate the
automatic stay when it recalculated the Rodriguezes‟ postpetition escrow payments on their mortgage account to include
certain pre-petition escrow arrears. For the following reasons,
we will vacate the order of the District Court and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
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I. Factual and Procedural Background
The Rodriguezes financed the purchase of their home in
Monmouth County, New Jersey, with a purchase-money
mortgage from First Mutual Corp., with Countrywide acquiring
the mortgage thereafter. Under the terms of the mortgage, the
Rodriguezes‟ monthly payments consisted of (1) an amount to
cover principal, interest, and any late fees, and (2) an amount to
cover taxes, insurance, and “other charges.” App. at 119-20.
The second part of the monthly payment—for taxes, insurance,
and other charges—was to be paid into an escrow account and
used, as needed, by Countrywide to pay for those expenses as
they became due.
As permitted by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act of 1974 (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., Countrywide
required the Rodriguezes to pay an amount into the escrow
account that was higher than required to cover the actual cost of
taxes, insurance, and other charges.
RESPA permits a
mortgagee to determine the amount of a debtor‟s monthly
payment by estimating the property taxes and insurance that will
be due over the ensuing twelve months and to add a reserve
requirement equal to one-sixth of that total estimate. See 12
U.S.C. § 2609(a)(1).
The Rodriguezes fell behind on their mortgage payments
and filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code on October 10, 2007. At the time of filing,
they were $20,844.40 in arrears on eight months of mortgage
payments, plus foreclosure fees and costs. While the bulk of the
arrearage was for principal and interest payments, $5,657.601
1

The Bankruptcy Court calculated the total escrow
arrearage at $6,364.80, apparently by multiplying the monthly
escrow amount ($707.20) by eight months and then adding a
ninth month for the first post-petition deposit, which is how
Countrywide represented the arrearage. The discrepancy is
immaterial to our decision.
3

was an escrow arrearage for taxes, insurance, and other charges.
Of the $5,657.60 amount, $3,869.91 was attributable to
payments which Countrywide had already made for taxes,
insurance, and other charges. The remaining $1,787.69 was the
amount for which Countrywide had not made corresponding
payments for taxes, insurance, and other charges. In other
words, the $1,787.69 amount was Countrywide‟s cushion.
Despite this arrearage, at the time of the bankruptcy filing, the
Rodriguezes‟ escrow account showed a projected surplus of
$2,494.89, although the actual balance was a negative amount
due to the missing escrow payments.
After the bankruptcy filing, Countrywide issued to the
Rodriguezes a revised escrow analysis and demand for payment
which indicated that Countrywide had boosted the monthly
escrow payment amount to $947.77 from $707.20. The new
$947.77 figure was comprised of $650.10 for the base escrow
payment, $210.65 for the “[s]hortage payment,” and $87.02 for
the “[r]eserve requirement.” App. at 64. The basis for the
increased escrow amount was a post-petition escrow shortage.
Countrywide calculated the revised escrow payments by
presuming that the escrow balance at the time of the bankruptcy
filing was $0.00 because the Rodriguezes had not contributed
any funds to the account. In other words, Countrywide did not
treat the $1,787.69 cushion as funds that existed at the time of
the bankruptcy filing. Instead, by starting with a balance of
$0.00 in the escrow account, Countrywide calculated the postpetition escrow shortage as including the $1,787.69 cushion that
the Rodriguezes had never, in fact, paid.
On December 2, 2007, the Rodriguezes filed a motion in
the Bankruptcy Court to enforce the automatic stay pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 362(a), compel Countrywide to “cease post[]petition collection of pre-petition escrow claims,” and award
the Rodriguezes attorneys fees and costs. Id. at 1-10; id. at 4.
The denial of that motion, affirmed by the District Court, is the
subject of this appeal.
4

On January 15, 2007, Countrywide filed its proof of
claim with the Bankruptcy Court. Countrywide sought a total of
$21,283.71 in pre-petition arrears, including $3,869.91 for the
pre-petition escrow deficiency, which was the amount that
Countrywide actually had paid out for taxes, insurance, and
other charges. In other words, Countrywide did not seek to
recoup the $1,787.69 cushion via the bankruptcy process, but
rather by assessing the Rodriguezes higher post-petition monthly
escrow payments to make up for the shortfall.
The Rodriguezes argued to the Bankruptcy Court and
then to the District Court that Countrywide was required to
submit the entire escrow shortage as part of its proof of claim in
the bankruptcy proceeding, and that the Bankruptcy Code‟s
automatic stay forbids collecting any of the pre-petition shortfall
by increasing the amount of the post-petition escrow payments.
The Bankruptcy Court and District Court disagreed, holding that
the amount by which a bankrupt homeowner is delinquent in
monthly payments that would be maintained in escrow by the
lender until the amount was due is not subject to the automatic
stay. This appeal followed.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
158(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and
1291 and “exercise the same standard of review as the District
Court when it reviewed the original appeal from the Bankruptcy
Court.” In re Handel, 570 F.3d 140, 141 (3d Cir. 2009). Thus,
we review the Bankruptcy Court‟s findings of fact for clear error
and exercise plenary review over that Court‟s legal
determinations. Id.
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III. Discussion
A.

Countrywide’s Post-Petition Escrow Recalculation

The issue before us is whether the automatic stay
prevents Countrywide from accounting for the pre-petition
escrow shortage in its post-petition calculation of the
Rodriguezes‟ future monthly escrow payments. The automatic
stay, under section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, is triggered
upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. That section provides
that “any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case,” outside
the course of the bankruptcy proceeding, is stayed during the
bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). The automatic stay is
applicable only to claims that arise pre-petition, and not to
claims that arise post-petition. See In re Grossman’s Inc., 607
F.3d 114, 122 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Crucial to our determination of whether Countrywide
violated the automatic stay is whether it had a “claim” against
the Rodriguezes for the unpaid $1,787.69 prior to the
Rodriguezes‟ bankruptcy filing. If Countrywide had no claim
for the unpaid escrow amount until that amount was, in fact,
needed to cover taxes, insurance, and other charges that were
due, then Countrywide had no right to collect those monies prepetition and it could not have violated the automatic stay.
The Bankruptcy Code defines “claim” very broadly to
mean:
(A) right to payment, whether or not
such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated,
unliquidated,
fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed,
undisputed,
legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
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(B) right to an equitable remedy for
breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment,
whether or not such right to an
equitable remedy is reduced to
judgment,
fixed,
contingent,
matured,
unmatured,
disputed,
undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
In reviewing § 101(5), the Supreme Court observed that
the language “right to payment” in the definition of “claim”
meant “nothing more nor less than an enforceable obligation[.]”
Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83 (1991). It
reiterated that “Congress intended by this language to adopt the
broadest available definition of „claim.‟” Id.; see also FCC v.
NextWave Pers. Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 302 (2003).
In Grossman‟s, this Court, sitting en banc, endorsed this
broad interpretation of the term “claim,” overruling the narrow
“accrual test” established in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville
Co., which focused on the phrase “right to payment” in § 101(5)
and when the right arose. Grossman‟s, 607 F.3d at 121,
overruling Frenville, 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984). We
explained that this focus on the “right to payment” failed “to
give sufficient weight” to the other words in the statutory
definition that modified the term “claim,” i.e., “contingent,”
“unmatured,” and “unliquidated.” 607 F.3d at 121. These
modifiers, we concluded, mean that a “„claim‟ can exist under
the [Bankruptcy] Code [by virtue of the terms „contingent,‟
„unmatured,‟ and „disputed,‟] before a right to payment exists
under state law.” Id.
With this definition in mind, we turn to the terms of the
mortgage. The mortgage held by Countrywide specified the
Rodriguezes‟ required payments and Countrywide‟s right to
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accelerate the payment date and seek foreclosure in case of
default:
2.
Monthly Payment of Taxes,
Insurance, and Other Charges.
Borrower shall include in each
monthly payment, together with the
principal and interest as set forth in
the Note and any late charges, a sum
for (a) taxes and special assessments
levied or to be levied against the
Property . . . . [T]hese items are
called “Escrow Items” and the sums
paid to Lender are called “Escrow
Funds.”
...
The Escrow Funds are pledged as
additional security for all sums
secured by this Security Instrument.
...
7.
Charges to Borrower and
Protection of Lender‟s Rights in the
Property. Borrower shall pay all
governmental or municipal charges,
fines and impositions that are not
included in paragraph 2.
...
If Borrower fails to make these
payments or the payments or the
payments required by paragraph 2,
or fails to perform any other
covenants and agreements contained
8

in this Security Instrument . . . then
Lender may do and pay whatever is
necessary to protect the value of the
Property and Lender‟s rights in the
Property, including payment of
taxes, hazard insurance and other
items mentioned in paragraph 2.
...
9. Grounds for Acceleration of
Debt.
(a) Default.
Lender may,
except as limited by regulations
issued by the Secretary in the case of
payment defaults, require immediate
payment in full of all sums secured
by this Security Instrument if:
(i) Borrower defaults
by failing to pay in full any
monthly payment required by
this Security Instrument prior
to or on the due date of the
next monthly payment, or
(ii) Borrower defaults
by failing, for a period of
thirty days, to perform any
other obligations contained in
this Security Instrument.
...
18.
Foreclosure Procedure.
If
Lender requires immediate payment
in full under paragraph 9, Lender
9

may
foreclose
this
Security
Instrument by judicial proceeding,
and any other remedies permitted by
applicable law.
App. 118-123.
The Bankruptcy Court concluded that Countrywide‟s
recalculation of the Rodriguezes‟ post-petition monthly escrow
payments did not violate any provision of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Court explained that the pre-petition “claim” was limited to
amounts that Countrywide had a right to retain and not merely a
right to collect. Under that reasoning, no debt to Countrywide
arose until Countrywide had, in fact, made a corresponding
payment for taxes or insurance. The Court was concerned that
requiring Countrywide to recover the full past-due escrow
amount through the bankruptcy process would have the effect of
requiring Countrywide to give the Rodriguezes an interest-free
loan for the entire course of the Chapter 13 plan. It explained
that RESPA permitted Countrywide to recalculate escrow
payments to avoid a shortage and that the Rodriguezes had
failed “to explain satisfactorily why such rights afforded lenders
under RESPA should be abrogated in the context of a Chapter
13 bankruptcy proceeding.” App. at 143. It further explained
that Countrywide “serves merely as a conduit” for tax and
insurance payments “and should only recover in bankruptcy for
such items actually disbursed on behalf of mortgagors.” Id. at
145. The District Court agreed with the Bankruptcy Court‟s
conclusion that Countrywide was free to include the pre-petition
escrow shortage in its post-petition calculation of the
Rodriguezes‟ future monthly escrow payments.
On appeal, the Rodriguezes argue that under the broad
definition of “claim,” when they fell behind on their mortgage
payments Countrywide had a claim for the pre-petition escrow
deficiency, including the $1,787.69 cushion. Accordingly, the
argument goes, Countrywide violated the automatic stay by
taking into account part of the pre-petition escrow deficiency in
10

calculating their post-petition escrow payments. Countrywide
responds that the word “claim,” as used in Section 101(5), is
limited to debt, and that “[a]n escrow account is not a debt . . .
[but rather] is an asset held by the servicer for the borrower that
is used to pay the borrower‟s tax and insurance obligations and
to protect the lender‟s collateral.” Appellee‟s Br. at 16. In
support of this narrow definition of “claim,” Countrywide cites
Johnson, in which the Supreme Court stated, in a footnote
addressing a different issue (determining which liabilities are
extinguished in a bankruptcy case), that “debt” “has a meaning
coextensive with that of „claim.‟” 504 U.S. at 84 n.5. Under
Countrywide‟s view, if it foreclosed and sold the property, the
Rodriguezes would certainly not be liable for the escrow
shortfall related to the cushion because at that point there would
be no future payments and thus no need for a cushion. Instead,
according to Countrywide, the Rodriguezes would be liable for
the escrow shortfall corresponding to payments Countrywide
actually made for taxes and insurance. Thus, Countrywide
contends, the shortage with respect to the escrow cushion is not
a debt, and instead is merely a security interest.2
2

Relying on In re Villarie, 648 F.2d 810 (2d Cir.
1981), Countrywide also argues that despite how broadly
“claim” has been defined by Congress and the courts, it cannot
bring a claim for the missed pre-petition escrow payments
because the mortgage does not provide it with an enforceable
right to do so. Separate and apart from the fact that Villarie has
little or no relevance here as it involved the interpretation of a
particular provision of New York City administrative law, we
see nothing in the mortgage that would prevent Countrywide
from suing for the payments or that would limit its options to
acceleration of a debt and foreclosure. We note in passing that
in Campbell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 545 F.3d 348
(5th Cir. 2008), the relevant terms of the loan documents were
almost exactly the same as the relevant terms of the mortgage
here, yet Countrywide took the position that it had the right to
proceed against the Campbells for the unpaid escrow. It is
unclear why it has changed its position.
11

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed a
substantially similar question in Campbell v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 545 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2008). In Campbell, the
security instrument to which the lender and the debtors were
parties had terms similar to those here, including a term
authorizing the lender (coincidentally, Countrywide) the right to
collect regular payments to cover insurance and tax expenses
and to retain those funds in an escrow account for payment as
the expenses became due. 545 F.3d at 350-51. After the debtors
filed for bankruptcy, Countrywide filed a proof of claim that did
not include unpaid escrow amounts, but indicated in its proof of
claim that it intended to increase the debtors‟ monthly mortgage
payments post-petition to recoup the unpaid pre-petition escrow
amounts. Id. at 351. The debtors filed suit, alleging that
Countrywide violated the automatic stay, and the bankruptcy
court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the debtors,
holding that Countrywide had impermissibly attempted to
collect a pre-petition debt and that its actions violated the
automatic stay. Id.
Countrywide argued to the Fifth Circuit that it had no
“claim” to the unpaid escrow amounts because a claim only
accrued when Countrywide paid an escrow expense. Id. at 353.
The Fifth Circuit rejected Countrywide‟s “imaginative
argument,” and, relying on the terms of the loan documents,
found that Countrywide had a claim against the debtors each
time the debtors failed to make an escrow payment. Id. at 35354. The Fifth Circuit stated that “[t]he touchstone of any „claim‟
is . . . an enforceable „right to payment‟ from the debtor.” Id.
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Because the loan
documents provided Countrywide with recourse, Countrywide
had a claim against the debtors prior to the bankruptcy filing
when the debtors failed to pay required escrow amounts. Id.
The Fifth Circuit rejected Countrywide‟s arguments that
(a) RESPA allowed it to recalculate the post-petition mortgage
payments in the manner it used; and (b) under 11 U.S.C. §
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1322(b)(2),3 the bankruptcy court did not have the power to
modify Countrywide‟s right to recalculate the mortgage
payments. The Fifth Circuit stated that its holding did not limit
Countrywide‟s rights under RESPA or the Bankruptcy Code,
and that “[t]he automatic stay operates to halt collection of prepetition claims, even those claims held by a creditor protected by
the anti-modification provision of Section 1322(b)(2).” Id. at
354 (citing 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1322.06[1][a] (15th ed.
Rev. 2007)). It reached this conclusion because “[t]he stay does
not determine a creditor‟s claim but merely suspends an action
to collect the claim outside the procedural mechanisms of the
Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, staying Countrywide‟s attempt to
collect pre-petition escrow amounts does not bar Countrywide
from asserting its contractual rights in the bankruptcy court.” Id.
Finally, although the Fifth Circuit held that Countrywide
had a pre-petition claim to the unpaid escrow amounts, it
reversed the bankruptcy court‟s determination that Countrywide
had violated the automatic stay because Countrywide did not
collect the increased post-petition escrow amount “or take any
action outside the bankruptcy proceeding to collect it.” Id. at
355. Simply asserting in a proof of claim that the debtors owed
a higher escrow payment did not violate the automatic stay. Id.
The Bankruptcy Court ruled on the Rodriguezes‟ motion
approximately three months before the Fifth Circuit decided
Campbell. The District Court noted that decision, but discussed,
albeit briefly, only the Fifth Circuit‟s conclusion that
Countrywide had not violated the automatic stay, and concluded
that the Fifth Circuit “did not actually reach the issue at hand in
the instant appeal.” App. at 166. That, of course, was incorrect.
3

Section 1322(b)(2) states that a bankruptcy plan
may “modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than
a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is
the debtor‟s principal residence, or of holders of unsecured
claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of
claims.” 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
13

We find Campbell persuasive. It instructs that the loan
documentation is relevant in determining whether there is an
obligation to make an escrow payment and whether that
obligation is enforceable. 545 F.3d at 354. As in Campbell, the
terms of the Rodriguezes‟ mortgage establish that the obligation
to pay into the escrow account was enforceable. Thus,
Countrywide had a claim for the unpaid escrow.
We recognize that the unpaid escrow amounts may not
have constituted “debt” under the terms of the mortgage until
Countrywide actually disbursed its own funds to cover an
escrow expense for which there was a shortage. This fact,
however, does not undermine our conclusion that the unpaid
escrow constitutes a claim. Grossman‟s instructs that our focus
should not be on when the claim accrues (with disbursement of
Countrywide‟s own funds), but whether a claim exists. 607 F.3d
at 121. Here, Countrywide‟s right to successfully collect may be
contingent on a disbursement by Countrywide of its own funds
to satisfy an escrow item for which there is a deficiency. But the
contingent nature of the right to payment does not change the
fact that the right to payment exists, even if it is remote, and
thereby constitutes a “claim” for purposes of § 101(5).4

4

Following the Fifth Circuit‟s lead in Campbell, we also
reject Countrywide‟s argument that forcing it to recoup the
missed escrow cushion payments through the Chapter 13 plan
improperly modifies Countrywide‟s rights under RESPA and
“Regulation X,” 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17. As the Campbell court
held, at least implicitly, the principle of protecting the debtor
from all efforts to collect pre-petition claims outside of the
Chapter 13 structure takes precedence over Countrywide‟s other
rights under RESPA to recalculate the escrow payments. See
Campbell, 545 F.3d at 353-54; id. at 353 (noting that “the issue”
was whether Countrywide‟s recalculation rights under RESPA
“overrides bankruptcy principles” and finding that it does not).
14

B.

Violation of the Automatic Stay

Having determined that the $1,787.69 escrow cushion
should have been part of Countrywide‟s proof of claim, the
question arises as to whether Countrywide violated the
automatic stay when it sought the cushion outside of the
bankruptcy proceeding.
Section 362(k)—formerly section
362(h)—of the Bankruptcy Code provides for recovery of actual
damages for willful violations of the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(k); see also In re Lansdale Family Rest., Inc., 977 F.2d
826, 829 (3d Cir. 1992) (considering former § 362(h)). Because
both the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court determined
that Countrywide was permitted to calculate the missed escrow
payments outside of the bankruptcy proceeding, they never
reached the issue of whether Countrywide willfully violated the
automatic stay when it sent the Rodriguezes a demand for higher
monthly escrow payments. Whether Countrywide willfully
violated the automatic stay and, if so, the extent, if any, of the
Rodriguezes‟ damages, are matters that should be resolved in the
first instance on remand.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the decision of
the District Court and remand this matter to the District Court
for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
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In Re: Francisco Rodriguez, No. 09-2724

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, Dissenting.
In 1974, Congress enacted the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (ARESPA@), 12 U.S.C. '' 2601-2617, to govern
the procedures to be followed in connection with escrow
accounts established to ensure the payment of real estate taxes
and insurance. When there has been a default, RESPA authorizes
a loan servicer to estimate the property taxes and insurance that
will be due over the ensuing twelve months and to adjust the
borrower=s monthly escrow payments under the mortgage to
cover the estimated expenses, subject to certain limitations. See
id. ' 2609(a)(1)-(2).1 Regulation X, RESPA=s implementing
regulation, also allows a loan servicer to conduct the analysis at
the inception of the loan, at the end of each computation year, or
Aat other times during the escrow computation year.@ 24 C.F.R.
' 3500.17(f)(1)(ii). As part of this procedure, RESPA and
Regulation X authorize a servicer to Arequire the borrower to pay
additional deposits to make up the shortage or eliminate the
deficiency@ in an escrow account. Id., see also 12 U.S.C. '
2609(a)(2). A Adeficiency@ is Athe amount of a negative balance
in an escrow account.@ 24 C.F.R. ' 3500.17(b). A Ashortage@
is Aan amount by which a current escrow account balance falls
short of the target balance at the time of escrow analysis.@ Id.
In its opinion on the Debtors= appeal, the District Court
noted: A[T]he parties agree [that as of the petition date,] the
Debtors= [the Rodriguezes=] escrow account was actually
deficient by $3,869 B the total amount Countrywide paid for
property taxes and insurance on behalf of Debtors in excess of
the funds Debtors actually deposited into their escrow account.@
In re Rodriguez, No. 08-5207, slip op. at 2 (D.N.J. May 11,
2009). Consistent with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Act,
Countrywide included that amount in its proof of claim, and then
1

Regulation X of RESPA provides for a twelve-month
forward-looking analysis to determine how much money must be
deposited monthly into the escrow account. See 24 C.F.R. '
3500.17(b).

recalculated the remainder of the escrow precisely as provided
under RESPA.
For purposes of the forward-looking calculation,
Countrywide treated the Rodriguezes= escrow account as having
a zero balance on the Petition Date. Because of the
Rodriguezes= failure to keep the required escrow payments
current, Countrywide set the Rodriguezes= post-petition escrow
payment at $947.77, which reflected a monthly increase $240.57
over their pre-petition escrow payment of $707.20.2 The higher
payment as authorized by Regulation X was intended to avoid
the escrow shortage that would have occurred as taxes and
insurance became due over the ensuing twelve months.3
In discussing RESPA, the Bankruptcy Court stated:
[A] lender must estimate future property taxes and
assessments, as well as insurance premiums, and allocate
the estimated sum over a period sufficient to provide
adequate funds to pay the escrow charges when due. This
right is limited by RESPA which proscribes lenders from
requiring a borrower to deposit in any escrow account an
aggregate sum which exceeds the amount sufficient to
pay taxes, insurance premiums and other charges with
2

The Bankruptcy Court held that Countrywide had
mistakenly included a pre-petition October 2007 tax bill in its
post-petition escrow analysis and therefore recalculated the
post-petition monthly shortage payment as $94.53, not $210.65,
thereby reducing the total-post petition monthly payments to
$831.65, not $947.77 as Countrywide originally calculated.
Countrywide does not challenge this revision. In re Rodriguez,
391 B.R. 723, 731-32 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2008).
3

Whereas the Rodriguezes= pre-petition escrow payment
was based on a projected escrow surplus that assumed they were
making their payments, the higher post-petition escrow payment
was based on the shortage that would develop were the
Rodriguezes to continue to pay the same monthly escrow that
resulted in the escrow arrearage.
2

respect to the property during the ensuing twelve-month
period, plus one-sixth of the estimated total of such
amounts. 12 U.S.C. ' 2609(a). This limitation, however,
is subject to exception. If the lender determines that a
deficiency exists, the lender may require the borrower to
make additional monthly deposits into the escrow account
to remedy such deficiency, but must notify the borrower
of any shortage of funds. 12 U.S.C. ' 2609(a)(2), (b).
Upon the borrower's payment of the escrow amounts, the
mortgage requires the lender to hold the funds in
accordance with RESPA and to apply the funds to pay the
escrow charges when due, but no later than the time
specified under RESPA.
RESPA also authorizes lenders, like Countrywide,
to calculate and collect certain Aadvance deposits in
escrow accounts,@ or shortage contributions, in order to
minimize any negative balance that may occur in a
borrower=s escrow account over the twelve months when
Countrywide must disburse funds to protect the property
(e.g. insurance, PMI payments, and taxes)[.]
In re Rodriguez, 391 B.R. 723, 727-28 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2008)
(footnote omitted).
The majority fails to acknowledge that Countrywide acted
in accordance with RESPA. On the other hand, the Bankruptcy
Court correctly noted that:
Debtors . . . fail to explain satisfactorily why such rights
afforded lenders under RESPA should be abrogated in the
context of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. Debtors=
required shortage contribution is a charge authorized by
and calculated in accordance with RESPA, as well as the
underlying loan agreement . . . .
Id. at 729.
The majority never even tries to explain why RESPA is
inapplicable. The Bankruptcy Court recognized the practical
3

effect of the Debtors= argument, which it rejected:
In effect, Debtors seek to have Countrywide include in its
pre-petition arrearage, to be paid over the life of the
Chapter 13 plan, not only sums actually disbursed by
Countrywide for items such as taxes and insurance, but
also such additional sums the Debtors should have paid
into the escrow account prior to filing. Moreover, Debtors
contend that in projecting the twelve month summary
balance of the Debtors= escrow account, Countrywide
should not have started at zero, but rather should have
calculated the lowest projected escrow balance as if the
Debtors had made the requisite pre-petition monthly
payments.
Id. Of course, the Debtors never made those payments, and it
made little sense to credit them for payments never made.
Instead, Countrywide included in its claim the escrow amounts
which it paid.
The majority posits that Countrywide should have
included in its claim filed in the bankruptcy the escrow amounts
not yet due (an amount the majority calculates as $1,787.69), an
argument rejected by the Bankruptcy Court. That Court agreed
with Countrywide=s contention that its pre-petition claim should
be limited to the amounts actually disbursed.
The Bankruptcy Court cogently explained why
Countrywide=s analysis was correct and why the definition of
Aclaim,@ though broad, is not without limit:
A Aright to payment@, as incorporated in the statutory
definition of Aclaim@ under 11 U.S.C. ' 101(5) implicitly
encompasses a right of retention, which is not subsumed
in Countrywide=s Aright to collect@ escrow items. Absent
sums actually expended, as permitted under the loan
documents to protect its own collateral interest,
Countrywide need not include pre-petition escrow arrears
in its proof of claim inasmuch as the mortgage instrument
only permits Countrywide to retain such funds as
4

reimbursement to the extent of actual advances.
Otherwise, Countrywide merely collects and holds such
funds for payment to third parties.
Id. at 730.4
This conclusion is consistent with the Second Circuit=s
interpretation of Aclaim@ in In re Villarie, 648 F.2d 810, 812 (2d
Cir. 1981), which, contrary to the majority=s assertion, is
germane. There, the court held that even though a state pension
fund had the ability to deduct payments from a state employee=s
paycheck in order to pay back a loan, the fund had no right to
sue for the amount of the loan because the employee was, in
effect, borrowing from his own retirement. Accordingly, there
was no enforceable claim against the debtor. Id. Such a
conclusion is even more appropriate here because the mortgage
provides no means of recovering the non-paid escrow funds.
The only remedy is acceleration of payment of other sums B the
sums actually secured by the mortgage. This interpretation of
the meaning of a Aclaim@ is consistent with the provisions of
RESPA which authorize a lender to recalculate future escrow
fund payments at a variety of junctures to ensure that shortages
are covered.
Outside of bankruptcy, mortgagors with a negative
escrow account can and should expect to have their
4

The additional $1,787.69 the majority believes
Countrywide should have included in its proof of claim bears no
relationship to the monthly shortage payments Countrywide
sought post-petition. Indeed, as calculated by the Bankruptcy
Court, the Rodriguezes= monthly post-petition shortage payments
should be $94.53 a month. Over the course of a year, this
amounts to approximately $1,134.30.
391 B.R. at 732.
Perversely, under the majority=s opinion, Countrywide is
required, and indeed allowed, to claim $1,787.69 in Bankruptcy
for the missed escrow payments, when it would have been
entitled to increase the shortage payments by only $1,134.30
over the course of a year.
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escrow account re-examined, in accordance with RESPA
regulations, and be assessed an additional monthly charge
for the escrow shortage. No one would suggest that
non-debtors could seek to have a lender calculate an
escrow shortage contribution, by giving credit for missed
monthly payments. Certainly, there is no reason to
afford Chapter 13 debtors with such rights, and this Court
finds nothing in either RESPA or the Bankruptcy Code
which mandates such a result. Accordingly, this Court
regards Countrywide's approach in treating the Debtors=
escrow account as having a zero balance as logical,
reasonable and supported by applicable non-bankruptcy
law.
391 B.R. at 731.
The majority relies on language in the Fifth Circuit
opinion in Campbell v. Countrywide Home Loans, 545 F.3d 348
(5th Cir. 2008), which is arguably dicta. In any event, that
decision is not binding on us.
More important is that the majority opinion sets up an
irreconcilable conflict between two federal statutes, RESPA, 12
U.S.C. ' 2609(a), and the Bankruptcy Code=s automatic stay, 11
U.S.C. ' 362(a). Under the majority=s approach, it is difficult to
foresee that any mortgage lender that seeks to recalculate escrow
due in accordance with RESPA and Regulation X would not be
in violation of the automatic stay. In effect the majority is
abrogating RESPA. That is a serious step - one that a federal
court should hesitate to do. As the Supreme Court has stated:
The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among
congressional enactments, and when two statutes are
capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent
a clearly expressed congressional intention to the
contrary, to regard each as effective.
Morton v. Manchuria, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). The
majority=s opinion fails to follow the admonition of the Supreme
Court in Morton as it has made no effort to accommodate its
6

interpretation of RESPA with that of the Bankruptcy and District
Courts in this case.
For the reasons set forth, I respectfully dissent.
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